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Social capital is an important factor explaining differences in economic growth among 
regions. However, the key distinction between bonding social capital, which can lead 
to lock-in and myopia, and bridging social capital, which promotes knowledge flows 
across diverse groups, has been overlooked in growth research. In this paper, we 
address this shortcoming by examining how bonding and bridging social capital affect 
regional economic growth, using data for 190 regions in 21 EU countries, covering 
eight waves of the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2016. The findings 
confirm that bridging social capital is linked to higher levels of regional economic 
growth. Bonding social capital is highly correlated with bridging social capital and 
associated with lower growth when this is controlled for. We do not find significantly 
different effects of bonding social capital in regions with more or less bridging social 
capital, or vice versa. We examine the interaction between social and human capital, 
finding that bridging social capital is fundamental for stimulating economic growth, 
especially in low-skilled regions. Human capital also moderates the relationship 
between bonding social capital and growth, reducing the negative externalities 
imposed by excessive bonding.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Social capital has become an attractive concept for both scholars and policy-makers. 
The former (e.g. Asheim, 2003; Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009; Boschma, 2005; 
Crescenzi & Gagliardi, 2015; Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, & Storper, 2011; Putnam et al., 
1993; Rodríguez‐Pose & Storper, 2006; Storper, 2005, 2013) see it as a useful concept 
in explaining differences in economic growth among regions. The latter – for example 
the World Bank (1998), the OECD (2001) and the European Union (Eurobarometer, 
2005) – are increasingly thinking about how to use social capital as a policy tool for 
facilitating growth. While in theory, social capital is an attractive concept, in practice “it 
is difficult if not impossible to imitate one region’s social capital process in other places” 
(Malecki, 2012, p. 1033). Without understanding how social capital works, policies, 
programmes and projects using it to foster economic growth across regions are bound 
to fail.     
Broadly, social capital can be defined as a variety or combination of aspects of social 
structure or features of social organisation, and aggregates of institutionalised 
relationships, such as trust, networks and norms that facilitate cooperative action 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam et al., 1993). Within the social capital 
literature, an important distinction is often made between bonding and bridging forms 
of social capital (Patulny, 2009; Putnam, 2000; Westlund & Larsson, 2016). Bonding 
social capital refers to closed networks that link homogenous groups, whereas bridging 
social capital refers to open networks that link heterogeneous groups (Putnam, 2000). 
The balance of bonding and bridging social capital either blocks or fortifies the sorting 
and matching of economic activities with consequences for uneven economic growth 
among regions (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009; Farole et al., 2011; Putnam, 2000; 
Rodríguez‐Pose & Storper, 2006; Storper, 2005, 2013; van Staveren & Knorringa, 
2006).  
Empirical studies have implicitly (Beugelsdijk & Van Schaik, 2005) or explicitly 
(Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009) paid attention to the differences between the effects 
of bonding and bridging social capital on economic growth. However, empirical findings 
on the effects of bonding and bridging social capital on regional economic growth 
remain inconclusive (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009; Westlund & Adam, 2010). The 
dominant theoretical assumption is that bonding and bridging social capital 
complement each other (Putnam, 2000; Rodríguez‐Pose & Storper, 2006; Storper, 
2005, 2013; Woolcock, 2010), but this has so far not been adequately explored.  
Furthermore, the relationship between social and other forms of capital, notably human 
capital, in promoting economic growth remains unclear. Putnam et al. (1993) and 
Fukuyama (1995) have, for example, suggested that human capital may have a 
moderating effect on both bonding and bridging social capital. An important question 
is whether social capital can, to some extent, substitute for human capital and, as such, 
represent an alternative path to growth for low-skilled regions. Or, conversely, whether 
the two are mutually dependent, such that social capital requires a high level of human 
capital in order to foster growth.  
This paper extends existing knowledge on how bonding and bridging social capital 
affect economic growth, as well as on how their effects are moderated by human 
capital. Accordingly, we address the following research questions: First, we examine 
how bonding and bridging social capital affect regional economic growth. Second, we 




the levels of bridging social capital in the region, and vice versa. Finally, we assess the 
extent to which the effects of bonding and bridging social capital on regional economic 
growth vary depending on human capital. 
In order to address these questions, we conduct a panel data analysis of 190 regions 
in 21 EU countries. Using the eight waves of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 
2016, we construct a purpose-built dataset covering more data and for a longer period 
than prior studies on the role of social capital for economic development at the regional 
scale (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009). The findings confirm the differences between 
the effects of bonding and bridging social capital on economic growth. The two are 
highly correlated, and individually each is associated with higher levels of growth. 
However, when both are included in the same model, interesting differences emerge: 
while bridging social capital has a positive effect on regional economic growth when 
controlling for bonding, bonding social capital is negative for growth when controlling 
for the level of bridging in the region. Furthermore, the findings confirm that human 
capital moderates the effects of social capital on economic growth. An increase in 
human capital reduces the negative effects of bonding social capital – i.e. bonding is 
particularly harmful in low-skilled regions. Meanwhile, bridging social capital works as 
a substitute for human capital. Specifically, bridging social capital has a stronger effect 
on growth in regions with lower levels of human capital. Hence, high levels of bridging 
social capital can, to some extent compensate, for a lack of human capital in low-skilled 
regions.  
The rest of the paper follows this structure: Section 2 examines the literature on social 
capital and economic growth. Section 3 presents the data and empirical model. Section 
4 presents the results and discussion. Section 5 is the conclusion.  
 
2. Social capital and regional development  
This paper conceptualises and operationalises social capital as an aggregate construct 
at a regional level (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009; Beugelsdijk & Van Schaik, 2005; 
Putnam et al., 1993). At the same time, it takes a multi-dimensional approach in which 
social capital is considered to comprise bonding and bridging social capital (Patulny, 
2009; Putnam et al., 1993; Westlund & Larsson, 2016). Specifically, the focus is on the 
structural or network dimensions of bonding and bridging social capital and their effects 
on economic growth.  
According to Putnam et al. (1993), networks transmit trust, reduce transaction costs 
and information asymmetry, and increase the density and intensity of interactions with 
positive externalities on economic growth in regions. Although the paper focuses on 
economic growth, it also draws on related studies looking at other socio-economic 
outcomes, such as innovation (Crescenzi & Gagliardi, 2015), regional diversification 
(Antonietti & Boschma, 2018; Cortinovis, Xiao, Boschma, & van Oort, 2017), and 
entrepreneurship (Feldman, Siegel, & Wright, 2019). 
The next section starts by separately discussing bonding and bridging social capital 
and their effect on economic growth. This is followed and concluded with a synthesis 
that brings the two together to develop the hypotheses that inform the empirical 





2.1 Bonding social capital 
Putnam (2000: 22) defines bonding social capital as “inward looking [networks that] 
tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups”. The term is related to 
concepts such as strong ties and within-group cohesion. Bonding is fundamentally 
characterised by a tightening of relationships and networks within the group, while, 
simultaneously, excluding non-members (Granovetter, 1977).  
There are three different positions in the literature on how bonding social capital 
operates. The first position treats bonding social capital networks as “Olson-type 
groups” or “distributional coalitions” (Antonietti & Boschma, 2018; Cortinovis et al., 
2017; Crescenzi & Gagliardi, 2015; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Rodríguez‐Pose & Storper, 
2006; Storper, 2005; 2013). This builds on the observations by Olson (1982) that 
interest groups create benefits for members, but impose disproportionate costs on the 
wider society. Thus, despite their benefits in terms of interest articulation and 
preference matching, their total effect is negative on the whole of society. From this 
perspective, strong bonding within a place will result in rent-seeking, insider-outsider 
problems, clientelism, and nepotistic practices, which block economic progress 
(Crescenzi & Gagliardi, 2015; Farole et al., 2011; Rodríguez‐Pose & Storper, 2006; 
Storper, 2005; 2013).  
The second position is that bonding social capital is complementary to bridging social 
capital and therefore leads to beneficial social and economic outcomes (Portes, 1998; 
Storper, 2005, , 2013; Woolcock, 2010). Social control and sanctions, as well as the 
supporting nature of bonding social capital, are to a certain degree necessary for 
developing bridging social capital and achieving broader socio-economic outcomes.  
The third position, which is perhaps the most reconciling, is that bonding social capital 
can have both positive and negative consequences, depending on the context (Farole 
et al., 2011; Patulny & Svendsen, 2007; Portes, 1998). Thus, other contextual factors, 
such as human capital, influence the effects of social capital on growth. Human capital 
could either substitute for or complement social capital (Schuller 2001). For instance, 
building on Putnam et al. (1993) and Fukuyama (1995), human capital can have a 
moderating effect that reduces the potential negative externalities of bonding social 
capital. The mechanisms through which human capital works include what Wollebæk 
and Selle (2002) describe as cumulative and moderating effects. Directly, human 
capital facilitates the interaction between heterogenous groups (Dinda, 2014). This 
process is cumulative in that an increase in interaction leads to more interaction. 
Indirectly, human capital promotes trust and openness, which encourages interaction 
beyond bonding social networks (Akçomak & Ter Weel, 2009; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Tabellini, 2010). This has moderating effects in that it improves the quality of 
relationships across heterogenous groups of people within and across regions. At the 
same time, regions with high levels of human capital generate more new knowledge 
and have higher absorptive capacity that promotes economic growth and development 
(Andersson & Johansson, 2010; Andersson & Karlsson, 2007; Smith & Thomas, 2017), 
reducing the danger of lock-in associated with bonding social capital. Conversely, the 
effects of bonding social capital in these contexts can also be positive as it helps to 
promote the flow of knowledge in the region.  
Empirical research on the effects of bonding social capital remains inconclusive. 
Findings from studies on economic growth (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009; Hoyman, 




regional diversification (Cortinovis et al., 2017) generally show a negative coefficient, 
but rarely a strong and significant effect. Overall, these findings are ambivalent as to 
whether bonding social capital has a negative effect on economic growth. However, 
Beugelsdijk & Smulders (2009) find an indirect negative effect, insofar as bonding 
social capital tends to reduce the levels of bridging social capital.  
2.2 Bridging social capital  
Bridging social capital refers to the existence of open networks that connect 
heterogeneous groups (Antonietti & Boschma, 2018; Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009; 
Boschma, 2005; Cortinovis et al., 2017; Crescenzi & Gagliardi, 2015; Rodríguez‐Pose 
& Storper, 2006; Storper, 2005, 2013). These networks are often also called “Putnam 
groups”, building on the argument by Putnam et al. (1993) that participation in civic or 
voluntary associations, such as educational and cultural groups, leads to positive 
social and economic outcomes. There are several mechanisms through which bridging 
social capital may work directly or indirectly to promote economic growth (Bjørnskov, 
2006). Connections between heterogeneous groups increase the diversity of 
knowledge sources (Rodríguez-Pose & von Berlepsch, 2019; Solheim, Boschma, & 
Herstad, 2020). This facilitates creativity (Florida, 2002; Florida, Mellander, & Stolarick, 
2008), innovation (Crescenzi & Gagliardi, 2015), firm entry (Malecki, 2012), and 
entrepreneurship (Feldman et al., 2019).  
Bridging social capital is generally considered to have positive effects on socio-
economic outcomes (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009; Farole et al., 2011; Patulny & 
Svendsen, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Rodríguez‐Pose & Storper, 2006; Storper, 2005, 
2013; van Staveren & Knorringa, 2006; Westlund & Larsson, 2016). Although bridging 
is beneficial both individually and collectively, developing and maintaining it also 
involves considerable costs.  
Since bonding and bridging social capital are presented as opposite concepts in the 
literature, one might expect regions with a high level of bridging social capital to have 
low levels of bonding social capital, and vice versa (Bürcher & Mayer, 2018). However, 
this is not necessarily the case, as regions can have either high or low levels of both 
forms of social capital. Indeed, the two forms often go together, as regions that develop 
strong networks within groups are frequently also those that experience higher degrees 
of bridging across them. 
Furthermore, the effects of bridging social capital may also depend on the degree of 
bonding social capital in a place (Halpern, 2005; Storper, 2005, 2013; Rodríguez‐Pose 
& Storper, 2006; Woolcock, 1998). Thus, the two interact and operate at a continuum 
from low to high social capital, and their different mixes produce different outcomes. 
According to Halpern (2005), Rodríguez‐Pose and Storper (2006), and Storper (2005, 
2013), high forms of both produce better socio-economic outcomes, whereas high 
bridging and low bonding social capital result in an ‘anomie’ or lack of sanctions to 
ensure common expectations. Low bridging and high bonding results in amoral 
familism, while low levels of both lead to amoral individualism.  
There is a close relationship between social capital and trust (Putnam et al., 1993). 
Patulny (2009) argues that the concept of a narrow and wide radius of trust (Fukuyama 
1995) can be extended to bonding and bridging social capital, respectively. Arguably, 
bonding social has a limited radius, allowing some exchanges and interactions to 
happen, while also providing forms of social control and solidarity. This is beneficial, 




groups, which in turn, require some bonding in their formation. However, without a 
balance between the two types of social capital, high levels or excessive forms of 
bonding social capital can have an overall negative effect. As alluded earlier, the 
interaction between bonding and bridging remains underexplored in empirical 
research.  
As in the case of bonding, differences in human capital may also affect bridging social 
capital, as well as moderate its effects on socio-economic outcomes (Akçomak & Ter 
Weel, 2009; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Dinda, 2014; Fukuyama, 1995; Rupasingha, 
Goetz, & Freshwater, 2006; Tabellini, 2010). Human capital contributes to bridging 
social capital directly (Dinda, 2014) and indirectly (Akçomak & Ter Weel, 2009; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Tabellini, 2010). Directly, schooling increases interaction, which 
facilitates bridging networks. Indirectly, it promotes trust and openness, which, in turn, 
reduce conflict among dissimilar groups and increase their interaction. Human capital 
has been previously used as a control variable in empirical studies (e.g. Beugelsdijk & 
Smulders, 2009), but its interaction with bridging social capital has not been 
considered. Human capital can strengthen the positive effects of bridging social capital 
following the same mechanisms that reduces the negative effects of bonding social 
capital, insofar as it creates or attracts more new knowledge, which is then shared 
more effectively across heterogeneous groups in regions with high bridging social 
capital. However, bridging social capital can also be a substitute for human capital. 
Bridging promotes collaborative problem-solving and the effective exchange of 
knowledge across diverse groups, which can potentially compensate for stronger 
capabilities of individual problem-solvers in regions with high human capital. 
Overall, empirical studies on economic growth (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009) 
innovation (Crescenzi & Gagliardi, 2015), regional diversification (Cortinovis et al., 
2017), and income inequality (Hoyman et al., 2016) have, by and large, found bridging 
to be positively and significantly connected to growth. However, research on the 
relationship between bonding and bridging social capital remains inconclusive. There 
is also little research on how human capital might moderate the effects of bridging. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses  
Based on this overview of the literature on how bonding and bridging social capital 
influence economic growth, we develop three types of hypotheses. First, we examine 
the direct effects of each type of social capital on economic growth. The literature notes 
that bonding and bridging have opposite links to economic growth, as bridging tends 
to be beneficial while bonding can be harmful for growth (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 
2009; Farole et al., 2011; Putnam, 2000; Rodríguez‐Pose & Storper, 2006; Storper, 
2005, 2013; van Staveren & Knorringa, 2006). However, empirical findings (e.g. 
Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009), especially for bonding, have often not resulted in 
significant findings. Therefore, we test the following hypotheses:    
H1a: Bonding social capital is negatively associated with economic growth 
H1b: Bridging social capital is positively associated with economic growth 
Second, there is a theoretical proposition that bonding and bridging social capital are 
complementary and reinforce one another (Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2000; Rodríguez‐
Pose & Storper, 2006; Storper, 2005, 2013; van Staveren & Knorringa, 2006; 




H2: There is a positive interaction between the effects of bonding and bridging 
social capital on economic growth.  
Third, we expect human capital to shape the association of bonding and bridging social 
capital with economic growth. For bonding, a better endowment of human capital 
should reduce the negative effects of in-groups, as it provides greater potential for the 
generation of new knowledge within these groups. For bridging, the relationship is less 
clear. On the one hand, human capital may also generate more new knowledge that 
can be shared across heterogeneous groups and support the absorptive capacity of 
these groups. On this basis, we may expect a complementary relationship between 
the two. On the other hand, bridging could also substitute for human capital. Regions 
with a lower capacity to generate new knowledge may be able to compensate for this 
with a superior social structure that allows them to share knowledge more effectively 
across heterogeneous groups in society. If this is the case, we would expect a negative 
interaction between bridging social capital and human capital. Hence, we derive the 
following hypotheses:   
H3a: The negative connection between bonding social capital and economic 
growth declines as human capital increases. 
 
H3b: The positive connection between bridging social capital and economic 
growth is moderated by levels of human capital.  
 
 
3. Model and data 
3.1 Empirical strategy  
To examine the association between the two types of social capital and economic 
growth, we first run a pooled OLS model using levels of GDP per capita across regions 
as the outcome.1 We assess hypotheses H1a and H1b with the following model: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶 𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜒𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑟,𝑡  (1) 
 
Where 𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑡 is the log annual GDP per capita in region r at time t. 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡  
and 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶
𝑟,𝑡
represent bonding and bridging social capital. 𝜒
𝑟,𝑡
 denotes a vector of 
control variables, which, according to the existing literature, affect the growth of GDP per 
capita at a regional level in Europe. 𝜇𝑡 captures time-specific fixed effects; and 𝜀𝑟,𝑡 
denotes the error term. 
Second, we estimate a fixed-effects model to account for heterogeneity across regions. 
The fixed-effect model controls for unobserved heterogeneity across regions by 
incorporating regional fixed effects, denoted by ρr. 
 
1 We focus on levels of GDP per capita as a measure of economic growth, following a common approach 
in the literature (e.g. Hall & Jones, 1999; Easterly & Levine, 2001; Vieira & Damasceno, 2011). While 
other authors consider the rate of GDP per capita growth (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Mankiw et al. 
1995; Glaeser, Scheinkman & Schleifer, 1995), the high stability of social capital over time makes this 
approach less suitable (Hjerppe, 2003). Therefore, one might think of it as affecting the levels of GDP 
per capita which reflect long-run economic growth, rather than its rate of growth which reflects economic 
growth in the short term (Hall & Jones, 1999). In the same vein, the current levels of GDP per capita 




𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶 𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜒𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑟 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑟,𝑡  (2) 
For testing H2, we add an interaction term between bonding and bridging social capital, 
transforming the model in the following way: 
𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶 𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 +  𝜒𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑟 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑟,𝑡 (3) 
In order to test H3a and H3b, we include interaction terms between bonding social 
capital and human capital, and between bridging social capital and human capital, 
respectively: 
𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶 𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟,𝑡 +  𝜒𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑟 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑟,𝑡 (4) 
𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡𝛼 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶 𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟,𝑡 +  𝜒𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑟 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑟,𝑡 (5) 
Finally, we bring the three models in equations 2, 3 and 4 into a combined interaction 
model. We include the two-way interaction terms between the three sets of equations: 
bonding and bridging social capital, bonding and human capital, and bridging and 
bonding. Equation 5 shows the overall interaction model:  
𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 +
𝛽3 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟,𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 ∗
𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝐶𝑟,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑟,𝑡 +  𝜒𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑟 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑟,𝑡     (6)        
3.2 Data and variables 
We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS), European Values Survey (EVS), 
and European Statistical Office (Eurostat) for 190 regions in 21 EU countries at NUTS 
1 and NUTS2 level,2 covering eight waves from 2002 to 2016. The ESS and EVS data 
are collected at the individual level across regions every two and nine years, 
respectively. The Eurostat data are compiled on a yearly basis. Appendix 1 shows the 
definitions of the variables of interest and the respective indicators used to 
operationalise them. 
The dependent variable is regional economic growth, using the level of GDP per capita 
taken from Eurostat. The data are log transformed, due to skewness in the distribution 
of regional GDP.  
For the explanatory variables, bonding and bridging social capital, we use the EVS 
data to calculate the share of the population in each region actively participating in 
different types of organisations. We adopt the approach by Beugelsdijk and Smulders 
(2009) and Cortinovis et al. (2017) based on their argument that active participation is 
 
2 We use regions that correspond as much as possible to meso-level administrative units of their 
countries. These are NUTS1 regions for Germany, Belgium, and the UK and NUTS2 for the rest of the 
countries considered. Countries with only one NUTS level such as Estonia are excluded, as we only 
analyse countries with at least an intermediate level of government. Romania and overseas territories 
for Spain, Portugal and France are excluded due to insufficient data. The same applies to the Åland 





the most accurate way of operationalising bonding (bonding social capital) and bridging 
(bridging social capital) social capital, rather than focusing on membership, as previous 
literature has done (e.g. Putnam, 2000). 
Similar to Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2009) and Cortinovis et al. (2017), we distinguish 
between bonding and bridging social capital by classifying different types of 
organisations into “Olson” and “Putnam” groups which respectively exhibit rent-seeking 
behaviour, and openness and benefit for non-members. This also corresponds with 
Knack and Keefer's (1997) division. Accordingly, we classify participation in political 
parties, local political action groups, labour or trade unions and professional 
associations into “Olson” type groups. This is the indicator for bonding social capital 
networks. In the same way, we assign voluntary associations which exhibit different 
characteristics such as religious or church organisations, welfare, youth work, cultural 
activities, sports and recreation, women’s groups, development and human rights, 
environment and animal rights, peace and health into “Putnam” groups. These make 
the indicator for bridging social capital networks. In Appendix 1, we provide an overview 
of the individual voluntary associations and their classification into bonding and 
bridging social capital. 
For human capital, we follow existing literature in using the share of the population that 
has completed tertiary education as a proxy. Ideally, we would have restricted the 
analysis to human capital among members of “Olson” or “Putnam” groups for the 
estimation of how human capital interacts with social capital. However, we rely on 
aggregate data for European regions, which do not provide this level of detail.    
We control for other factors normally considered to influence economic growth at the 
regional level, such as research and development expenditure (R&D), employment in 
manufacturing (employment in manufacturing), population density (population 
density), and road accessibility (road accessibility). The last two variables are log 
transformed. Employment in natural resources (employment in natural resources) is 
used as an additional control in a robustness check. The control variables are from the 
Eurostat database.  
For all variables building on individual responses (i.e. the social capital measures), we 
first normalise the scales for each variable at the individual level by standardisation 
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Second, we calculate the mean across 
all individual respondents in each region to create regional level measures. For the 
social capital variables, we use the EVS data for 1999/2000 and 2009/2010 and match 
them with ESS data for 2002 and 2010, respectively. This can be done as both surveys 
consider the same social capital phenomena. Given that the ESS is run biennially, we 
use the ESS data to extend the EVS data to create measures of social capital. 
Consequently, the trend line of the ESS is used to extrapolate the EVS data to create 
a combined panel dataset for the period between 2002 and 2016.3 The advantage of 
combining both datasets is that they are unique surveys that complement each other: 
 
3 The ESS has variables that measure social capital aspects broadly, such as participation in voluntary 
associations. But it covers fewer dimensions than the EVS, which has several and more specific 
variables. However, the ESS covers more periods. This makes it helpful to use it as a trend line to 
extrapolate from the EVS data. The rationale behind this is that a common underlying factor explains 






The ESS is more precise at measuring generalised trust, while the EVS contains 
several more robust indicators for voluntary associations. The summary statistics for 
all the variables is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations between the variables. All variables are 
significantly and positively correlated with GDP, except for employment in 
manufacturing and employment in natural resources, which are both negative and 
significant. The correlations between most of the variables are low. However, bonding 
and bridging networks are highly correlated with a coefficient of 0.669. This strong and 
positive correlation supports the argument made earlier that bonding and bridging 
social capital are not opposites but can – and frequently do – go together. Indeed, the 
close association between them suggests that bonding social capital is necessary for 
the formation of bridging social capital (e.g. Halpern, 2005; Storper, 2005, 2011, 2013; 
Woolcock, 1998). Analysing this relationship further is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but the high positive correlation provides an important background for the analysis of 
the data. 
We check for multicollinearity and get an average variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.87, 
with VIF scores between 2 and 2.5 for bonding and bridging social capital, as shown 
in Appendix 3. This indicates that there is no severe multicollinearity affecting the 
analysis. 
Table 2. Pairwise correlations 
 
  
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Bonding social capital 1,520 -0.00851 0.173 -0.686 1.236 
Bridging social capital 1,520 -0.00611 0.185 -1.019 1.208 
Human capital  1,520 24.14 8.842 6.800 57.10 
R&D 1,520 1.414 1.175 -5.384 17.47 
Employment in manufacturing 1,520 16.89 6.867 2.900 39.40 
Employment in natural resources 1,520 6.612 6.423 -4.500 40.60 
Population density 1,520 4.887 1.119 1.194 8.910 
Road accessibility 1,520 14.48 0.817 11.62 16.00 
GDP per capita 1,520 10.01 0.405 8.497 11.06 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Bonding social capital 1.000        
Bridging social capital 0.669*** 1.000       
Human capital -0.012 0.057** 1.000      
Research and Development 0.096*** 0.203*** 0.460*** 1.000     
Employment in manufacturing -0.002 -0.048* -0.430*** -0.129*** 1.000    
Employment in natural resources -0.070*** -0.214*** -0.407*** -0.394*** -0.019 1.000   
Population density -0.005 0.093*** 0.286*** 0.226*** -0.176*** -0.425*** 1.000  
Road accessibility 0.026 0.172*** 0.210*** 0.282*** 0.086*** -0.537*** 0.721*** 1.000 




3.3  The distribution of bonding and bridging social capital in the EU 
The maps in Figures 1 and 2 display the average intensity of bonding and bridging 
social capital, respectively, in EU regions across the period 2002-2016. Overall, 
Western Europe has a higher intensity of both types of social capital than Eastern 
Europe. Nordic countries also show high levels of bridging social capital. Important 
within-country differences are detected in both bonding and bridging in many countries. 





Figure 2. Bridging social capital networks, average for 2002-2016       
               
The maps confirm the positive correlation between bridging and bonding social capital 
at the regional level. The extent to which the distribution of bonding and bridging is 
relatively similar on the maps is consistent with the idea that the two types of social 
capital can co-exist and are present in various mixes (e.g. Halpern, 2005; Storper, 
2013; Woolcock, 1998). 
  
4. Model and data 
4.1 Regression results 
 
First, we conduct a pooled OLS regression as a baseline to estimate model 1 to test 
hypotheses H1a and H1b, using a stepwise approach, as shown in Table 3. We start 
with bonding social capital in regression 1, followed by bridging social capital in 
regression 2, and both types of social capital in regression 3. Finally, we add the control 






Table 3. OLS- The effects of bonding and bridging social capital on economic growth 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
     
Bonding social capital  0.118**  -0.546*** -0.303*** 
 (0.060)  (0.076) (0.055) 
Bridging social capital   0.588*** 0.931*** 0.506*** 
  (0.054) (0.072) (0.053) 
Human capital    0.013*** 
    (0.001) 
R&D    0.074*** 
    (0.007) 
Employment in manufacturing     -0.011*** 
    (0.001) 
Population density    0.008 
    (0.010) 
Road accessibility    0.150*** 
    (0.014) 
Observations 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 
Number of regions 190 190 190 190 
R2 0.003 0.072 0.102 0.541 
Adjusted R2 0.00190 0.0716 0.101 0.539 
F test 3.890 118.1 86.55 254.5 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 shows that when bonding and bridging social capital are entered separately 
as in regression 1 and 2, both have a positive and significant association with the level 
of GDP per capita. Even though bonding and bridging are correlated, the coefficient 
for bridging social capital is almost five times higher than that for bonding social capital. 
When bonding and bridging social capital are entered into the analysis together in 
regression 3, bonding social capital turns negative, while bridging social capital 
remains positive, supporting H1a and H1b. This implies that – when controlling for 
bridging – high levels of bonding can limit economic performance. Meanwhile, bridging 
social capital is a fundamental factor for economic growth. When control variables are 
included in regression 4, the signs of the coefficients do not change, although the 
magnitude of both is reduced.  
The control variables give the expected results. Economic growth is linked to higher 
human capital and R&D investment, as well as to better accessibility. However, 
population density does not have a significant effect. Employment in manufacturing 
has a negative association with the level of GDP per capita. Consistent with 
Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2009), we find that bridging social capital is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, and is a fundamental factor for economic growth and 
development. Furthermore, there is a direct negative association between bonding 
social capital and GDP per capita, significant at the 1% level. It is worth restating that 
this result depends on controlling for bridging social capital. Hence, if bonding social 
capital is associated with higher levels of bridging social capital, as the strong positive 
correlation between them indicates, the relationship between bonding social capital 
and economic growth could be more complex that the simple negative coefficient would 
suggest. However, what the results do indicate is that the direct relationship between 




Hence, if two regions have the same level of bridging, the one with lower bonding would 
be expected to have higher levels of GDP per capita.  
The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in bridging social capital is 
associated with an increase of approximately 9.8 % in the level of GDP per capita. On 
the other hand, one standard deviation increase in bonding social capital is associated 
with a reduction of approximately 5.1 % in the level of GDP per capita in the region. 
These increases should be viewed in the context that social capital is relatively stable 
and changes slowly, and therefore, such increases happen over a long term. 
However, a pooled OLS estimation method does not account for unobserved 
heterogeneity across regions. Therefore, we move on to a more robust fixed effects 
estimation to exploit the richness of the panel data. Table 4 shows the fixed effects 
estimation results.  
 
Table 4. Fixed Effects- The effects of bonding and bridging social capital on economic 
growth 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
     
Bonding social capital 0.060***  -0.056** -0.048** 
 (0.018)  (0.024) (0.023) 
Bridging social capital   0.134*** 0.173*** 0.179*** 
  (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) 
Human capital    0.005*** 
    (0.001) 
Research and development    0.006* 
    (0.003) 
Employment in manufacturing    0.011*** 
    (0.002) 
Population density      -0.212*** 
    (0.046) 
Road accessibility     0.190*** 
    (0.043) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 
Number of regions 190 190 190 190 
R2 0.607 0.621 0.623 0.657 
Adjusted R2 0.549 0.564 0.566 0.604 
F test 255.6 270.7 242.2 179.8 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The results from the fixed effects regression confirm the signs of the coefficients of the 
OLS results. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is reduced. More bonding 
social capital is associated with a reduction of GDP at constant levels of bridging, while 
bridging social capital is associated with higher GDP at constant levels of bonding. A 
one standard deviation increase in bridging is linked with an increase of approximately 
3.4% in the level of GDP per capita. Conversely, one standard deviation in bonding is 
associated with a reduction of approximately 0.8% in the level of GDP per capita in the 
region. Overall, these results confirm the theoretical proposition that bonding is not 




beneficial for growth (Beugelsdijk & Van Schaik, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Storper, 2011, 
2013).  
Third, in Table 5, we test hypotheses H2, H3a and H3b by examining the three 
interaction terms in a stepwise approach. We start by entering the interaction between 
bonding and bridging social capital in regressions 1, followed by bonding and human 
capital in regression 2 and bridging and human capital in regression 3. Finally, we bring 
the interaction into a combined model in regression 4. We report all the regressions 
but only base our conclusions on the margin plots for regression 4.  
 
Table 5. Fixed Effect-Interaction models  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In regression 1, we test H2. We expect bonding and bridging to be complementary and 
hence to find a positive interaction term. The interaction effect, as shown in Table 5, is 
significant, but, in contrast to expectations, with a negative sign. This suggests that 
bonding and bridging are substitutes. In regressions 2 and 3, we estimate how 
variations in human capital endowments shape the relationship between social capital 
and economic growth, testing hypotheses H3a and H3b, respectively. The interaction 
between bonding and human capital is negative but not significant. The interaction 
between bridging and human capital is negative and significant, suggesting that the 
two are substitutes; that is, at lower levels of human capital, bridging social capital 
becomes more important for economic growth.  
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Bonding social capital -0.033 -0.026 -0.053** -0.203*** 
 (0.023) (0.052) (0.023) (0.074) 
Bridging social capital  0.178*** 0.178*** 0.312*** 0.430*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.049) (0.068) 
Human capital 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D 0.005 0.006* 0.006 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employment in manufacturing 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population density -0.203*** -0.211*** -0.199*** -0.185*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Road accessibility 0.199*** 0.189*** 0.183*** 0.195*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Bonding * Bridging social capital -0.125***   -0.121*** 
 (0.037)   (0.037) 
Bonding * Human capital  -0.001  0.006** 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Bridging * Human capital   -0.005*** -0.010*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 
Number of regions 190 190 190 190 
R2 0.660 0.657 0.659 0.664 
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.604 0.606 0.611 




Finally, we bring all the interactions into a combined model in regression 4. The results 
are consistent with those from regressions 1-3. The interaction between bonding and 
bridging is negative and significant, suggesting that the two are substitutes. 
Furthermore, the interaction between human capital and bonding is positive and 
significant, suggesting that human capital moderates the negative influence of 
excessive bonding on growth. Finally, the interaction between human capital and 
bridging is negative and significant, suggesting that bridging social capital can act as 
a substitute for human capital.  
In order to interpret the interaction effects, we proceed, as advised by Brambor, Clark, 
and Golder (2006) and Kingsley, Noordewier, and Bergh (2017), to plot the marginal 
effects (Figures 3 to 6) in order to visualise what these results mean in substantive 
terms. Accordingly, we plot the marginal effects of bonding social capital at different 
levels (from the 10th to the 90th percentile) of bridging social capital in the region as 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Marginal effect of bonding social capital by level of bridging social capital 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the marginal effects of bonding at different levels (from the 10th to the 
90th percentile) of bridging social capital in the region. Although there is a negative 
slope, there are no significant differences between the marginal effects of bonding at 
the 10th and 90th percentile of bridging social capital. The effect of bonding social capital 
is significantly negative at levels of bridging social capital above around -0.03, which 
is slightly above the median score on this variable (53rd percentile). Thus, bonding 
reduces economic growth only in regions with high levels of bridging. Hence, we find 
no evidence or support H2 that there is a positive complementarity between bonding 
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 Figure 4. Marginal effect of bridging social capital by level of bonding social capital  
 
 
We also check the inverse relationship by plotting the marginal effects of bridging by 
different levels (from the 10th to the 90th percentile) of bonding social capital in Figure 
4. Once more, there is a negative slope, but the marginal effect of bridging remains 
positive at all levels of bonding social capital. Bridging is associated with economic 
growth regardless of the level of bonding social capital in the region. There are also no 
significant differences between the effects of bridging at the 10th and 90th percentiles 
of bonding social capital. Therefore, we do not find support for H2 and theoretical 
propositions (e.g. Storper, 2013) that the two types of social capital complement nor 
substitute each other. These findings also supported by the high positive correlation 
between bonding and bridging, which suggests the need to investigate whether 
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Figure 5. Marginal effects of bonding social capital by level of human capital 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that an increase in human capital reduces the negative effect of 
bonding social capital. The effects of bonding turn insignificant when the share of the 
working-age population with tertiary education increases above 25 percent. This is 
slightly above the median level of human capital in European regions (55th percentile). 
The marginal effects of bonding are also significantly lower in regions where 10 percent 
of the working-age population have tertiary education than in regions where 40 percent 
have tertiary education. We thus find support for H3a that human capital moderates 
bonding social capital, reducing its adverse connection to economic growth. These 
findings confirm theoretical propositions that human capital directly (Dinda, 2014) and 
indirectly (Akçomak & Ter Weel, 2009; Fukuyama, 1995; Tabellini, 2010) reduces the 
negative externalities of bonding. Regions with high levels of human capital can 
generate and absorb more knowledge (Andersson & Johansson, 2010; Andersson & 
Karlsson, 2007; Smith & Thomas, 2017) which reduces the adverse effects of bonding 
social capital.  
Figure 6 shows the marginal effects of bridging social capital at different levels of 
human capital in the region. The effect of bridging decreases as the level of human 
capital increases, from 0.33 in regions where 10 percent of the working-age population 
have tertiary education to 0.04 (ns) in regions where 40 percent have tertiary 
education. There are statistically significant differences between the marginal effects 
of bridging at low and high levels of human capital. The effect of bridging turns 
insignificant when the tertiary education share increases above 37 percent (around the 
91st percentile of the variable). Hence, we find that human capital and bridging social 
capital are to some extent substitutes: as the human capital endowment increases, 
there is less need for bridging. However, bridging has a significant positive link to 
growth in most regions in Europe, with a few very highly educated regions representing 
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of bridging social capital. The findings suggest that bridging is more important for 
regions with low levels of human capital than for high-skilled regions. It facilitates 
collaboration and access to knowledge outside the region, which is particularly 
important if the region’s internal knowledge capacity is lower (Andersson & Johansson, 
2010; Andersson & Karlsson, 2007; Mayer & Baumgartner, 2014).  
 




4.5 Robustness tests 
 
We assess the robustness of the results in Table 7. Regression 1 repeats the results 
of the fixed-effects model in Table 4. First, in regression 2, we use the share of 
employment in natural resources instead of manufacturing as a control variable. The 
results are very similar to the results in regression 1, except that bonding social capital 
is only significant at the 90 percent level. Second, in regression 3, we use the 
membership of voluntary associations instead of active participation. The results retain 
the same signs of coefficients and adjusted R2, but the estimated coefficients are 
higher and the significance level stronger. Third, in regression 4, we omit regions in 
the Nordic countries, which traditionally have high levels of social capital due to 
widespread, but often passive, membership of trade unions. Sweden also represents 
an anomaly relative to Denmark and Finland in terms of its low levels of bonding, 
especially in Central and Northern Sweden. The results retain the same signs of 
coefficients, and adjusted R2 but a lower significance for bonding social capital at 10% 






Table 7. Robustness tests 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, in Table 8, we lag the explanatory variables and controls in the regression 
equations in Table 7 such that they explain the level of GDP per capita in the next 
period (two years later). The results are consistent with those reported in Table 7. 
However, bonding social capital is no longer significant, although the coefficient retains 
the same sign. When measured in the form of membership, bonding social capital 
remains negative and significant. Overall, the results of the regressions in Table 7 and 
Table 8 show that the findings are robust to alternative specifications. However, it is 
not our intention to make a causal claim in this paper. Rather, we aim to offer an 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
  
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Bonding social capital -0.048** -0.036*  -0.047* 
 (0.023) (0.022)  (0.024) 
Bridging social capital 0.179*** 0.154***  0.182*** 
 (0.023) (0.022)  (0.024) 
Human capital 0.005*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D 0.006* 0.005 0.005 0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Employment in manufacturing 0.011***  0.011*** 0.014*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Population density -0.212*** -0.182*** -0.194*** -0.218*** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) 
Road accessibility 0.190*** 0.143*** 0.180*** 0.201*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.046) 
Employment in natural resources   -0.019***   
  (0.001)   
Bonding networks membership   -0.121***  
   (0.021)  
Bridging networks membership   0.193***  
   (0.024)  
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,384 
Number of regions 190 190 190 173 
R2 0.657 0.682 0.654 0.645 
Adjusted R2 0.604 0.633 0.600 0.590 




Table 8. Robustness tests with lagged variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Bonding social capital -0.038 -0.017  -0.038 
 (0.026) (0.025)  (0.028) 
Bridging social capital 0.194*** 0.158***  0.197*** 
 (0.026) (0.025)  (0.027) 
Human capital 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Research and development 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Employment in manufacturing 0.009***  0.009*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Population density -0.228*** -0.216*** -0.213*** -0.233*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) 
Road accessibility -0.008 -0.055 -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) 
Employment in natural resources  -0.016***   
  (0.002)   
Bonding networks membership    -0.117***  
   (0.024)  
Bridging networks membership     0.206***  
   (0.027)  
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,211 
Number of regions 190 190 190 173 
R2 0.573 0.596 0.567 0.563 
Adjusted R2 0.497 0.523 0.489 0.484 
F test 116.5 127.6 113.3 101.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 




There has been a considerable amount of interest in the role of different types of social 
capital for economic growth (e.g. Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2009). However, this 
research has remained inconclusive on how bonding and bridging social capital shape 
economic growth (Westlund & Adam, 2010), in particular when it comes to the effects 
of bonding social capital. There are gaps in our knowledge about the interaction 
between bonding and bridging social capital, and between social capital and human 
capital, especially at the regional level. The main contribution of this paper has been 
to address these gaps. Accordingly, we have extended existing knowledge on bonding 
and bridging social capital by examining the interaction between them, as well as 
analysing how their effects depend on the level of human capital in the region. 
The analysis has three main findings. First, we confirm that bonding social capital has 
a negative and significant connection with economic growth when controlling for 
bridging social capital, while the connection of bridging is positive and significant. 
Second, contrary to the dominant theoretical assumptions (Storper,  2013), we do not 
find evidence that bonding and bridging social capital complement each other, nor that 
they are substitutes. Third, we find that while human capital has a moderating effect 




bridging. Hence, bridging social capital is more important for growth in regions with 
deficiencies in human capital endowment. 
The main policy implication stemming from the analysis is, first, that not all types of 
social capital are the same. Policy-makers need to focus mainly on promoting bridging 
social capital with the aim of bringing together heterogeneous groups as a potential 
channel to achieve higher levels of development. Second, building bridging networks 
can be a particularly effective strategy for promoting growth in low-skilled regions. 
Bridging social capital allows for more effective knowledge exchange and collaborative 
problem-solving that can, to some extent, compensate for lower levels of formal 
education. These traits are even more important when education levels are generally 
low. However, the marginal effects of bridging social capital remain positive in all but 
the most high-skilled regions of Europe. Regions with high levels of human capital can 
therefore also benefit from the promotion of bridging. At the same time, investments in 
human capital is an alternative approach that policy makers can use to mitigate the 
negative effects of excessive bonding social capital and promote economic growth and 
development in less developed regions. 
This study is, however, not without limitations. First, we focus only on EU regions and 
this limits the generalisability of the findings. Future studies should consider including 
more regions from other parts of the world. This will potentially improve the explanatory 
power of social capital and the generalisability of the findings. Second, the dependent 
variable is limited to economic growth. There is therefore a need to consider other 
socio-economic outcomes alongside economic growth. It is possible that social capital 
may have different effects on other socio-economic outcomes (Hauser, Tappeiner & 
Walde, 2007; Hoyman et al., 2016; Maskell, 2000).  
Furthermore, the study focused on understanding the differences and interactions 
between bonding and bridging social capital and how they affect economic 
development. The study did not examine their structural relationships, whether bonding 
is a necessary condition for bridging, and if it has an indirect association with economic 
development. However, the study reports a high positive correlation between bonding 
and bridging social capital, which cautions against a simplistic view of their 
characteristics and how they affect economic development. Therefore, there is a need 
for future studies to examine the structural relationship between bonding and bridging 
social capital and how this relates to economic performance. The same applies to the 
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Appendix 1: Overview of variables 
 




Natural Log of GDP per capita GDP at current market 
prices,  





Participation in voluntary 
association that encourage 
relationships between similar or 
familiar people, membership in 
the same networks is used for 
robustness check. These 
networks are also termed 
Olsonian groups. 
• Labour unions  
• Professional 
organisations 
• Local political action 
groups 





Participation in voluntary 
association that encourage 
relationships between dissimilar 
or unfamiliar people, termed 
bridging networks, membership 
in the same networks is used for 
robustness check. These 
networks are also termed 
Putnam groups   
• Social welfare 
organisation 
• Cultural activities 
• Youth 
• Sports clubs 
• Organisation for health 
• Peace movement 
• Environment 
• human rights 
• Women’s organisation 
• Religious organisations 
EVS 
Control variables 
Human capital Human capital measured using 
education as a proxy 
Percentage of population 





Share of employment in 
manufacturing as a percentage 
of total employment, share of 
employment in natural 
resources is used as an 
alternative control in robustness 
test. 
Percentage of employment in 





Research and development R&D expenditure as a 




Natural Log of pop density Population density per 1000 












Appendix 2: VIF for variables 
 
 
VARIABLES VIF 1/VIF 
Road accessibility 2.51 0.40 
Population density 2.38 0.41 
Bridging social capital  1.95 0.51 
Bonding social capital  1.85 0.54 
Human capital  1.60 0.62 
Employment in manufacturing 1.41 0.71 
Research and development (R&D) 1.38 0.73 
Mean VIF  1.87  
 
